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Abstract
Structural models of housing or product choice use observed demand to estimate
household preferences. However, household demand may be partly determined by bor-
rowing constraints, limiting households’ choice set. Such borrowing constraints will dif-
fer across locations, households, and years. We put forward a model of neighborhood
choice with borrowing constraints that accounts for mortgage credit approval rates.
We estimate the model’s parameters using micro-level data on households, property
transactions and mortgage applications for the San Francisco Bay. Approval rates vary
significantly both across households and across neighborhoods. The model with bor-
rowing constraints yields significantly higher estimated willingness to pay to live close
to good schools and in majority-white neighborhoods. The model provides general
equilibrium estimates of the impact of a relaxation of lending standards. Between 2000
and 2006, the model provides two out-of-sample predictions: (i) a compression of the
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price distribution and (ii) a decline in black households’ exposure to white households.
Both predictions are supported by empirical observation.
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1 Introduction
The ability to secure mortgage credit is a key determinant of households’ decision to purchase
housing. Changes in lending standards may potentially shape the structure of cities. This
paper proposes and estimates a novel structural model of housing demand under borrowing
constraints, and estimates it to understand the role played by credit in shaping housing
demand. The model allows general equilibrium analysis of the effects of changes in lending
standards on the distribution of prices and on spatial segregation.
Structurally estimated models of consumer demand for differentiated goods have been
widely used to characterize the market for cars (Berry, Levinsohn & Pakes 1995), cereals
(Nevo 2000), newspapers (Fan 2013), and housing (Bayer & Timmins 2007, Bayer, Ferreira
& McMillan 2007). With limited data requirements, such models estimate the full set of own-
price and cross-price demand elasticities, as well as income elasticities. However, existing
models of consumer demand for differentiated goods, pioneered by Berry et al. (1995), do not
explicitly account for credit constraints. Credit constraints could be empirically important
in housing markets – more than 80% of purchases involve mortgage financing.1 Applied to
housing, these models thus face the risk of attributing to household preferences features of
household demand that in fact reflect households’ borrowing constraints.
This paper is, to the best of our knowledge, the first to extend the framework of Berry
et al. (1995) to account for the effect of endogenous borrowing constraints on household
demand. Using data on mortgage credit applications, transaction prices, as well as indi-
vidual and neighborhood characteristics, the model estimates households’ preferences and
willingness to pay for housing amenities in the San Francisco Bay area between 1990 and
2010.
The key empirical findings of the paper can be summarized as follows. First, borrowing
constraints significantly impact the estimation of preferences for housing and neighborhood
characteristics. When mortgage origination constraints are taken into account, households
181% in 2013 according to data provided by RealtyTrac
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exhibit a higher willingness to pay for schools with higher test scores, as well as for mostly
white neighborhoods. Second, the model with borrowing constraints allows a novel decom-
position of the own-price demand elasticity into two distinct parts: (i) a fraction of elasticity
that reflects the impact of a price increase on utility, and (ii) a fraction that reflects the
impact of a price increase on mortgage approval rates. Indeed, a higher loan-to-income ratio
reduces the probability of approval. Third, we run an out-of-sample general equilibrium anal-
ysis of the impact of a change in lending standards of the magnitude experienced between
2000 and 2006. In doing so, we show that our estimated model explains reasonably well
the price increase, the dispersion of price changes across neighborhoods, as well as observed
patterns of racial exposures that include the mobility of white households to majority-white
neighborhoods.
This paper’s model aims at retaining the tractability and identification properties of the
Berry et al. (1995) class of models but also incorporates estimated borrowing constraints. The
key feature of the model is that the likelihood of approval for mortgage applications in each
neighborhood directly affects the choice set of potential homebuyers – a typically substan-
tially smaller set of neighborhoods than the entire metropolitan area. Mortgage originators
approve borrowers’ applications based on a screening process that combines information on
loan amount and leverage (loan-to-income and loan-to-value ratios) with borrower creditwor-
thiness, property value, and neighborhood prospects. The screening process leads to binding
borrowing constraints for a substantial share of applicants (Ross & Yinger 2002, Dell’Arriccia,
Igan & Laeven 2009).
This paper’s structural model of location choice features such borrowing constraints. Ab-
sent borrowing constraints, households’ neighborhood demand results from a discrete choice
model, in which housing choices reflect neighborhood and housing characteristics, as well as
the interaction between neighborhood and housing characteristics. In that case, the intu-
ition of the standard Alonso et al. (1964) holds: households’ preferences for neighborhood
amenities are fully reflected in price differences. This is no longer the case when borrowing
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constraints are at play. In this case, households face different probabilities of access to mort-
gage credit for different neighborhoods – based on banks’ lending standards. The differential
availability of mortgage credit prevents households from fully arbitraging across locations;
and prices may not reflect the value of local amenities.
The probability of approval for a loan application is estimated using Home Mortgage Dis-
closure Act data, which includes both the income and race of the applicant, and is matched to
longitudinal data on neighborhood time-varying characteristics – including geocoded trans-
action prices. The coefficients of the probability of approval regression describe how banks’
lending standards convert individual, property, and neighborhood characteristics into a prob-
ability of mortgage loan approved. Lending standards constrain households’ neighborhood
choice set, likely affecting household demand. By comparing the results of the same model
estimated with and without borrowing constraints, we test whether borrowing constraints
bias estimated household preferences: preferences for neighbors’ race, income, education, for
houses’ year of construction, number of rooms, and for school test scores and distance to the
central business district.
Introducing borrowing constraints raises at least two estimation challenges. In the model
without borrowing constraints, Berry et al. (1995) have shown how observed demand maps
one-to-one with neighborhood utilities.2 This paper extends this key result to the case in
which each household demand is conditional on the set of neighborhoods for which house-
holds’ mortgage applications can be approved with some probability. Household preferences
for amenities are then estimated using a simulated method of moments estimator.3 The sec-
ond issue is in the estimation of mortgage approval probabilities, which is subject to potential
endogeneity bias due to unobservable borrowers’ characteristics. We estimate the impact of
borrower and mortgage characteristics on approval rates by comparing applicants with dif-
2The contraction mapping is shown to yield a unique vector of utilities, up to a constant, for every
observed vector of aggregate product demand.
3The total number of potential choice sets leads to our use of Simulated GMM: 2 to the power of the
number of neighborhoods is a very large number, leading to computationally intractable estimation when
using non-simulated demand.
5
ferent characteristics within the same neighborhood in the same year using tract–year fixed
effects in panel. A final issue is present in prior models of consumer choice. House prices
are typically endogenous with respect to local unobservables; this leads to an upward bias
in the estimated impact of prices on neighborhood utility. We use the set of characteristics
of adjacent neighborhoods as instruments for neighborhood price, in a similar way as Bayer
& Timmins (2007).
The model yields estimates of the preference of households for 4,416 neighborhoods (i.e.
census blockgroups) in the San Francisco Bay area. Household preferences vary along seven
broad dimensions: house price, neighbors’ observables, housing quality, distance to the cen-
tral business district, and school test scores as measured by California’s Academic Perfor-
mance Index. The model also estimates household preference heterogeneity using census
data for the 1% Census’ 120,029 households: preferences for neighborhoods vary according
to the household’s race, income, and unobserved heterogeneity. The model without borrow-
ing constraints yields significantly larger own-price demand elasticities than the model with
borrowing constraints. Without borrowing constraints, the estimated price elasticity cap-
tures implicitly both household preferences and credit conditions. The model with borrowing
credit constraints yields stronger estimated preferences for mostly-white neighborhoods, and
for neighborhoods with high-performing public schools. By contrast the model without bor-
rowing constraints tends to underestimate households’ willingness to pay for such amenities;
as households are constained by low mortgage approval probabilities in such locations.
The model with borrowing constraints yields two kinds of demand elasticities: conditional
and total (own-price) demand elasticity. Conditional demand elasticity assumes that mort-
gage approval probabilities and the resulting neighborhood choice set are left unchanged.
Total demand elasticity takes into account the effect of a price change on the choice set and
the effect of a price change on location choice within the choice set. Our estimation results
suggest that total demand elasticity can be 20 to 40 percent larger, in absolute value, as com-
pared to the usual conditional demand elasticity and exhibit a substantially larger degree
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of heterogeneity across households, reflecting differences in the intensity of the borrowing
constraints.
Finally, out-of-sample comparative statics are possible as city equilibrium is globally
unique under specific conditions, and locally unique under general conditions. We thus es-
timate how lending standard changes affect house prices and spatial segregation at general
equilibrium. Our first comparative statics result shows that a relaxation in lending stan-
dards, as observed in the Bay area between 2000 and 2006, leads to a compression of the
price distribution. Both in the model and in the data, neighborhoods that were less expensive
in 2000 saw a larger increase between 2000 and 2006 than initially more expensive neigh-
borhoods. This cross-sectional dispersion in house price change has been documented for a
number of U.S. cities. Landvoigt, Piazzesi & Schneider (2015), using a calibrated assignment
model, shows how the relaxation of collateral constraints can replicate this empirical find-
ing. However, our paper is, to our knowledge, the first that shows how this pattern emerges
within a structurally estimated model of housing with borrowing constraints. We also an-
alyze the effect of the same change in lending standard on spatial segregation. Very much
like in the data (Ouazad & Rancière Forthcoming), the model predicts a slight reduction
in the isolation of Blacks (−0.62), that results from largely offsetting forces: an reduction
in the exposure of Blacks to Whites (−2.04), and an increase in the exposure of Blacks to
Hispanics (+1.9) and to Asians (+0.76).
This paper contributes to the consumer choice literature sparked by Berry et al. (1995)
in consumer products and in housing by Bayer & Timmins (2007) and Bayer et al. (2007).4
The use of microdata in the estimation of the parameters, in our case on demographics
and neighborhood characteristics, builds on the approach of Petrin (2002). This paper’s
contribution is twofold. The paper’s first contribution is an estimated equilibrium model
that accounts for the effect of borrowing constraints on households’ choice sets. The paper’s
second contribution is the general equilibrium analysis of the impact of lending standards
4See Holmes & Sieg (2015) for a comprehensive survey of structural estimation in urban economics.
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on prices and on household segregation, as housing supply elasticity is likely smaller than
supply elasticity for consumer products.
By focusing on the effect of borrowing constraints in reducing the choice set, our paper
relates to already existing literature on incomplete product availability (Conlon & Mortimer
2013) or limited information on products (Goeree 2008). Our approach, however, differs
from that literature in two important ways. First, the reduction of the choice set in our
model is due to the endogenous decision of banks to approve mortgage loan applications.
Second, the reduction of the choice set in our model comes from the demand side rather
than for the supply side.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 introduces the economic model of location
choice with borrowing constraints and its equilibrium properties. Section 3 introduces the
empirical approach for identifying (section 3.1) and estimating (section 3.2) the model by
simulated generalized method of moments. Empirical findings are described in Section 4.
Section 5 presents the general equilibrium analysis of a change in lending standards. Section 6
concludes the paper’s findings.
2 The Model
We model a metropolitan area as composed by a number of neighborhoods, each formed by
housing units, and inhabited by a corresponding population of households. Time is discrete
and there is a finite number of time periods t = 1, 2, . . . , T . In year t, the metropolitan area
has a number Nt of households indexed by i = 1, 2, . . . , Nt. There is a fixed number of J ≥ 2
neighborhoods and each neighborhood j = 1, 2, . . . , J in year t = 1, 2, . . . , T has a number
sjt of housing units. Household i in year t chooses a neighborhood j(i, t) ∈ {1, 2, . . . , J} ≡ J,
s.t. j(i, t) belongs to the choice set Cit ⊂ J of household i in year t. The choice set Cit is a
subset of J and is equal to J if and only if household i is unconstrained in year t.
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(i) Neighborhood Choice j(i, t) Conditional on Credit Availability
Household i derives utility Uijt from neighborhood j in year t. Household i’s neighbor-
hood choice j(i, t) is based on maximizing utility within the choice set Cit, i.e. j(i, t) =
argmaxj∈CitUijt. Utility Uijt is allowed to vary across neighborhoods, across individuals, and
to vary across neighborhoods according to individual characteristics. Thus:
Uijt = δjt + x
′
itΩzjt + β˜
′
itzjt + εijt (1)
All throughout the paper, bold symbols denote vectors. Household i’s observable charac-
teristics are stacked in a vector xit of size K1 ≥ 1. Similarly, neighborhood j’s observable
characteristics are summarized by a vector zjt of sizeK2 ≥ 1. In utility specification (1), δjt is
the base utility that all households derive from living in neighborhood j in year t. The vector
δt thus captures variation in utility across neighborhoods independently of individual char-
acteristics. x′itΩzjt is a series of interaction terms between the K1 household characteristics
xit and the K2 neighborhood characteristics zjt, where Ω is the matrix of K1K2 interaction
coefficients. Therefore x′itΩzjt captures how neighborhood utility varies according to house-
holds’ observable characteristics. In contrast, the term β˜
′
itzjt captures how neighborhood
utility varies in household-specific unobservable dimensions. β˜it is a normally-distributed
vector of household-level heterogeneity with mean 0 and with variance-covariance matrix Σ.
Diagonal elements of Σ are noted σk, k = 1, 2, . . . , K2. Normalizing each random coefficient
β˜itk by σk, with β˜it =
(
β˜itk
)
k=1,2,...,K2
, the random term bitk = β˜itk/σk is standard normal.
Base utility δjt is explained both by the neighborhood’s log price, observable local ameni-
ties z′jtβ, and by unobservable neighborhood heterogeneity ξjt:
δjt = −α log(pjt) + z′jtβ + ξj + ζjt (2)
In utility specification (1), the random term εijt is extreme-value distributed. Following
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McFadden (1973), household i’s probability of choosing neighborhood j in year t, within his
choice set Cit, is:
P
(
Uijt ≥ Uikt, ∀k ∈ Cit
∣∣∣δ, z·t,xit, β˜it, Cit) = 1(j ∈ Cit) · exp(δjt + x′itΩzjt + β˜′itzjt)∑
k∈Cit exp(δkt + x
′
itΩzkt + β˜
′
itzkt)
(3)
where 1(j ∈ Cit) = 1 whenever j ∈ Cit, and 0 otherwise. Integrating over the vector
of random coefficients β˜it obtains the probability conditional on observables and on base
utility:
P (j, t|δ, z·t,xit, Cit) =
ˆ
β˜
P (j|δ, z·t,xit, β˜, Cit) · f(Σ−1/2β˜) · dβ˜ (4)
where f is the density function of the standard i.i.d. multivariate normal of dimension K2.
(ii) Endogenizing the Choice Set Cit ⊂ J
This paper focuses on constraints on the choice set driven by mortgage credit approval
decisions. A neighborhood j belongs to the choice set Cit of individual i in year t if a
mortgage lender approves household i’s application in neighborhood j. We thus model the
probability that a given neighborhood j belongs to the choice set Cit of household i by
incorporating mortgage lenders’ approval probabilities.
The choice set Cit is the product of banks’ approval probabilities for the applications of
household i. φijt is the probability that household i is approved for a mortgage in neighbor-
hood j in year t. With independent draws, the probability that household i’s choice set Cit
is exactly C ⊂ J is the binomial probability:
P (Cit = C) = Πj∈CP (j ∈ C)Πj /∈C [1− P (j ∈ C)] ≡ Πj∈CφijtΠj /∈C(1− φijt) (5)
Such formula assumes independent and identically distributed decisions, and an extension
of the model allows for non-zero correlation in banks’ decisions across neighborhoods for a
given household i.
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The probability φijt of approval is based on banks’ benefit-cost analysis of originating a
mortgage loan for household i for a house in neighborhood j. Such cost-benefit analysis is
summarized in a latent variable φ∗ijt. Household i’s application in neighborhood j is approved
if and only if φ∗ijt ≥ 0. The benefit minus cost φ∗ijt depends on household observables xit and
neighborhood characteristics zjt.
φ∗ijt = x
′
itψ + z
′
jtγ + x
′
itΨzjt + eijt (6)
Neighborhood characteristics zjt include a neighborhood fixed effect that captures location-
specific underwriting unobservables. The neighborhood’s log price either enters directly in
zjt, or enters as the log of the loan-to-income ratio in both xit (log household income) and
zjt (log house price). In both cases, a change in log price affects the probability of the choice
set. Ψ is the matrix of interaction terms. eijt is an i.i.d. logistically distributed random
heterogeneity with cumulative distribution function Λ(·). The probability of approval in
neighborhood j for household i is therefore simply a logistic function of individual and
household observables:
P (j ∈ Cit) = Λ
(
x′itψ + z
′
jtγ + x
′
itΨzjt
)
(7)
Combining (5) and (7), the probability of the choice set depends on the entire vector of
neighborhood observables:
P (Cit = C|xit, z·t) = Πj∈CΛ
(
x′itψ + z
′
jtγ + x
′
itΨzjt
)
Πk∈C
{
1− Λ (x′itψ + z′jtγ + x′itΨzjt)}
(8)
(iii) Neighborhood Demand
Total demand for neighborhood j in year t is the weighted average of the demands for neigh-
borhood j conditional on all possible choice sets. The weights are equal to the corresponding
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choice set probabilities.
P (j, t|δ, z·t,xit) =
∑
C∈C
P (j|δ, z·t, xit, Cit) · P (C|z·t, xit) (9)
As the set of all possible choice sets C has 2J , such actual demand is the sum over 2J
terms. Equation (9) is the actual demand for the demographic subgroup of households with
characteristics xit, i.e. the demand from households with a given income, race, education,
age, and other characteristics. The last step in obtaining total demand, from all demographic
subgroups, is to integrate over the distribution of individual demographics:
D(j, t) ≡ P (j, t |δ, z·t, f(·)) =
∑
C∈C
ˆ
x
P (j|δ, z·t, xit, Cit) · P (C|z·t, xit) · f(xit)dxit (10)
And f(xit) is the city-level distribution of household characteristics. We note D(j, t) such
total demand for neighborhood j in year t.
(iv) Demand Elasticities
As each household demand depends on the particular choice set probabilities of the house-
hold, demand elasticities conditional on the choice set differ from demand elasticities uncon-
ditional on the choice set. The first kind of (own-price) demand elasticity η|S is equal to the
effect of a change in the log price on demand keeping the choice sets Cit, i = 1, 2, . . . , N ,
t = 1, 2, . . . , T constant. For a fixed probability distribution P (C) over choice sets, we note
ηjt|C =
∂ logD(j, t)
∂ log(pjt)
∣∣∣∣
P (C)
(11)
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the own-price demand elasticity for neighborhood j in year t conditional on P (C).
ηjt|C =
1
D(j)
∂D(j, t)
∂ log(pjt)
∣∣∣∣
P (C) fixed
(12)
= − α
D(j, t)
∑
C∈C
ˆ
X
P (C|z·t,xit)P (j, t|δ, z·t,xit, C) (1− P (j, t|δ, z·t,xit, C)) f(xit)dxit
where α is the impact of log price on base utility (Equation (2)).5 In the simplified case
where the model does not feature random coefficients, and when there is a large number of
neighborhoods so that P (j) 1, such conditional demand elasticity is simply −α.
When prices change, probabilities P (C|z·t,xit) over choice sets C ⊂ J change as well.
Total demand elasticity η is equal to the sum of two effects: the price effect on demand due
to utility changes, and the price effect on demand due to changes in choice set probabilities,
ηjt = ηjt|C +
∑
C∈C
ˆ
x
[
∂
∂ log(pjt)
P (C|z·t, xit)
]
· P (j|δ, z·t, xit, Cit) · f(xit)dxit (13)
The second term of this expression (13) is the second price effect. An increase in house price
in neighborhood j causes a decline in demand because of (i) the lower utility value of the
neighborhood and (ii) the lower approval rate in neighborhood j.
The impact of a log price change on the choice-set probability is simply derived from the
individual approval probabilities.
∂
∂ log(pj)
P (C|z·t,xit;ψ) = ∂
∂ log(pj)
{Πk∈CφijtΠk/∈C(1− φijt)}
=
 a · (1− φijt)P (C|z·t,xit) if j ∈ C−a · φijt · P (C|z·t,xit) if j /∈ C (14)
where a is the coefficient of log price in the approval specification (6). Writing Φijt(C) =
5Derivations in the case where log price affects utility differently according to individual income (or
another characteristic) are available on demand.
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1(j ∈ C)− φijt, derivations lead to the following closed-form for total demand elasticity.
ηj = ηj|C +
1
D(j, t)
·
∑
C∈C
ˆ
X
Φijt(C) · P (C|z·t,xit;ψ) · P (j|δ, z·t,xit, C)f(xit)dxit (15)
(v) City Equilibrium
Households choose their location based on neighborhoods’ observable characteristics, includ-
ing the log price and neighborhoods’ characteristics. Therefore, two sets of conditions need
to be satisfied at equilibrium.
The first set of conditions is the equality of demand and supply for each neighborhood at
equilibrium. Subsections (i)–(iv) above have introduced household demand and its proper-
ties. The supply of housing in neighborhood j depends on the log price of housing of housing
in neighborhood j such that the supply of housing Sj(log(pjt)) in neighborhood j is an in-
creasing and concave function of log(pjt). In this paper’s empirical analysis, Sections 4–5,
supply is assumed perfectly inelastic, so that Sj(log(pjt)) = sjt for every j, t.6
Households have preferences for specific neighborhood demographics whenever the vector
zjt of neighborhood characteristics includes other households’ demand for the same neigh-
borhood. Neighborhood characteristics thus comprise a set wjt of exogenous characteristics
(e.g. the age of structures in the neighborhood) and a set of neighbors’ demographics vjt
(e.g. fraction of households with a college degree in neighborhood j). Note vjt(x) the frac-
tion of households with characteristic x. Write X+ the set of neighbors’ characteristics that
affect household utility.
Definition 1. Given the distribution of household observables f(xit), the vector of neigh-
borhood observables zjt, excluding log price, and unobservables ξj, ζjt, j = 1, 2, . . . , J , a
city equilibrium is a vector of prices and neighborhood demographics (p∗ = (p∗jt),v∗ =
6General equilibrium results accounting for the durability of housing, and thus accounting for a larger
supply than demand for housing in some neighborhoods, are available from the authors.
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(v∗jt))j=1,2,...,J, t=1,2,...,T such that:
∀j ∈ J, ∀t ∈ {1, 2, . . . , T}, D (j, t; p∗,v∗) = Sj
(
log(p∗jt)
)
(16)
∀x ∈ X+, vjt(x) = D(j, t|x; p
∗,v∗)
D(j, t; p∗,v∗)
(17)
Condition (16) expresses the equality of demand and supply. In condition (17), vjt(x) is
the fraction of households with characteristic x, for all neighborhood demographics x that
enters households’ utility for neighborhood j; D(j, t|x; p∗,v∗) is household x’s demand for
neighborhood j in year t. D(j,t|x;p
∗,v∗)
D(j,t;p∗,v∗) is the fraction of such households as derived from
equilibrium neighborhood demand.
The Appendix’s proposition 1 proves equilibrium existence using Brouwer’s theorem.
Proposition 2 proves global equilibrium uniqueness when households do not exhibit prefer-
ences for peers’ demographics, using an argument of gross substitutability. An equilibrium is
locally unique as in Debreu (1970), proven using Sard’s theorem. Local uniqueness enables
comparative statics analysis of lending standards (Section 5).
3 Identification and Estimation
This section presents the empirical approach for the identification (section 3.1) and estima-
tion (section 3.2) of borrowing constraints and of households’ preferences for neighborhood
amenities and neighborhood demographics.
3.1 Identification Strategy
The model includes three sets of parameters to estimate, which we identify using three sets of
corresponding moments. The first set of parameters determines the probability of approval
for a mortgage application, as given by the logit specification (7). This paper identifies such
parameters within neighborhoods and within years. The second set of parameters measures
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the impact of neighborhood observable and unobservables characteristics on base utility, in
specification (2). Identifying the impact of log house price on base utility requires a set of
instruments: log house prices are typically correlated with time-varying unobservables that
are not controlled for by the neighborhood-specific fixed effect. The paper presents a set of
IV moments as in by Berry et al. (1995) to that effect. Finally, the third set of parameters
measures how the valuation of neighborhood amenities depends on household characteristics.
We identify such preference heterogeneity using micromoments as in Imbens & Lancaster
(1994) and Petrin (2002).
(i) First Set of Moments: Lending Standards
The approval specification (6) predicts the probability of approval based on the characteris-
tics of the household, the time-varying characteristics of the neighborhood, a neighborhood
fixed effect, and an interaction between individual and neighborhood characteristics. The
neighborhood fixed effect captures non time-varying unobservables that are correlated with
the unobservable collateral (house) value for the loan and have an impact on the probability
of approval.
The identification challenge lies in the lack of observability of the full range of time-
varying household and house covariates that mortgage originators consider in the underwrit-
ing process. Empirical Section (4.2) presents a set of instrumental variables Θijt that are
arguably uncorrelated with the unobservables eijt of specification (6), affect the probability
of approval, and predict the characteristics xit of mortgage applicants. Such instrumental
variables, used in the context of a logit, provide the first set of moment conditions:
E [G0 (ψ0, γ0, ω0)] = E
[
Λ
(
x′itψ + z
′
jtγ + x
′
itΨzjt
)
Θijt
]
= 0 (18)
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(ii) Second Set of Moments: Base Utility
The second set of moments aims at identifying the impact of neighborhood amenities and
neighborhood demographics on neighborhood base utility (Specification (2)). Identification
of such parameters (α,β, ξ) encounters at least three challenges (i) neighborhood utility Uijt
in specification (1) is not directly observable, and thus base utility δjt at the left-hand side
of specification (2) is not directly observable; (ii) demand, defined in equation (10), is the
sum of a large number of 2J terms, one for each potential choice set Cit ⊂ {1, 2, . . . , J},
(iii) unobservable neighborhood amenities ζjt may be correlated with the price of housing
and with observable neighborhood amenities (e.g. school quality).
On the first issue, Berry et al. (1995) has shown that, given the interaction parameters
Ω, and the variance of the random coefficients Σ, there is a one-to-one mapping between
the vector of observed demands D = (Djt)j∈J,t∈{1,2,...,T} and the vector of base utilities
δ = (δjt)j∈J,t∈{1,2,...,T}, whenever households are unconstrained, i.e. φijt = 1 for all households,
all neighborhoods and all years. This paper shows that a similar result of existence and
uniqueness of the vector δ applies when the probabilities φijt of the choice set are introduced.
The unique vector δ is obtained by iterating the following sequence:
δˆ
k
= δˆ
k−1
+ log (Djt)− log
(
D
(
j|δˆ, z·t, xit
))
(19)
and at the limit δˆ = limk→∞ δˆ
k
of such sequence, predicted demand D(j|δ, z·t, xit) is equal
to observed demand Djt.
In the contraction mapping (19) , demand D
(
j|δˆ, z·t, xit
)
is the sum of demand for
all possible choice sets C ⊂ {1, 2, . . . , J}, weighted by the probability of that choice set
P (C). With J neighborhoods, there are 2J choice sets. In our empirical application where
households choose among more than 4000 small neighborhoods, computing over a sum of 24000
choice sets is computationally unfeasible. We proceed by simulating D
(
j|δˆ, z·t, xit
)
. A set of
S sets is drawn Csit, s = 1, 2, . . . ,S for each household i in each year t, where the probability
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of drawing the set C ∈ C of neighborhoods is Πj∈SφˆijtΠj∈S
(
1− φˆijt
)
. Estimation of demand
D
(
j|δˆ, z·t, xit
)
given base utilities, and observables thus is the average of the demands based
on the simulated choice sets Csit:
Dˆ
(
j|δˆ, z·t, xit
)
=
N∑
i=1
1
S
S∑
s=1
D
(
j|δˆ, z·t, xit, Csit
)
(20)
with D
(
j|δˆ, z·t, xit, Csit
)
the demand conditional on the choice set Csit. Train (2009) gives
conditions under which such a simulated method yields a consistent estimate of demand.
Furthermore, the integration over household characteristics
´
x
f(·)dx and over the random
coefficients
´
β˜
f(·)dβ˜ cannot proceed using analytic formulas and so we rely on Monte Carlo
integration following Geweke (1996). The simulated demand Dˆ thus replaces the actual
demand D in the sequence (δk) specified in (19).
The contraction mapping method provides an estimate δˆjt for each neighborhood in each
year. The estimation of the regression (2) by least squares will not identify the impact of
prices and amenities on utility. Least squares regression typically yield a positive coefficient
on log price, while consumer theory suggests a negative coefficient −α. The main reason is
that higher prices are likely to be correlated with the unobservable quality of the housing
stock, possibly leading to an upward bias on the log(price) coefficient in households’ utility
function. Empirical section 4.3 introduces L′ time-varying instruments Ξ = Ξjt orthogonal to
the unobservable neighborhood amenities ζjt, providing a first set of moment conditions for
the estimation of the impact of observable neighborhood amenities, house value, neighbors’
demographics zjt on base utility δjt. Specification (2) relating base-utility to house and
neighborhood characteristics zjt is first-differenced. The first moment condition expresses
the orthogonality of ∆Ξ with ∆ζ:
E(∆Ξ∆ζ) = 0 (21)
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where the change in unobservable amenities ∆ζjt depends on observable neighborhood char-
acteristics: ∆ζjt = ∆δjt − ∆z′jtβ, whose estimator ∆ζˆjt = ∆δˆjt − ∆z′jtβ follows from the
previously estimated vector of base utilities δˆ.
∆ζ depends on lending standards (ψ,γ,Ψ) and on preference parameters (α,β, ξ,Ω,Σ)
as the contraction mapping depends on predicted approval probabilities φˆijt and on the non
linear parameters (Ω,Σ). We write the moment condition (21) as E [G1(θ)] = E [∆Ξ∆ζ(θ)] =
0.
Moment condition (21) together with demand simulation (20) and the contraction map-
ping (19) allows for the estimation of households’ preferences for neighborhood amenities,
i.e. the coefficient β, but households’ preference heterogeneity remains to be estimated and
is covered in the next subsection.
(iii) Third Set of Moments: Preference Heterogeneity
The matrix of interaction coefficients Ω in utility specification 1, measures how heterogeneity
in household preferences is explained by households’ observables, and the variance covariance
matrix Σ = E
[
β˜itβ˜
′
it
]
measures how unobservable dimensions explain preference heterogene-
ity. Identification of the parameters Ω and Σ in (1) is provided by a third set of micro moment
conditions following Imbens & Lancaster (1994) and Petrin (2002). Specifically, the third set
of micro moments ensures that the predicted spatial distribution of households, e.g. by race
and income, matches the observed distributions of such households across neighborhoods.
Two data sources provide moment conditions useful for such identification. First, Cen-
sus micro data provides the characteristics xit of a sample of size N for all households
i = 1, 2, . . . , N . Second, neighborhood-level data provides elements of the distribution of
household characteristics x in each neighborhood j ∈ J. For instance, the census provides
log median family income per tract. Such information provides a third set of moments as we
match the predicted demand by demographic subgroup for each neighborhood to the actual
demand by this same subgroup. Consider X a set of observable characteristics such as, for
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example, the set of households with income above $50,000. Then the following moment
states that the number of households with characteristics X predicted by the model must
be equal to the number of such households in each neighborhood.
E
(∑
xit∈X
D
(
j|δˆ, z·t, xit, Cit
))
−DXjt = 0 (22)
with DXjt the observed number of such households in neighborhood j in year t. The sum∑
xit∈X D
(
j|δˆ, z·t, xit, Cit
)
the demand for neighborhood j from individuals with character-
istics in X as predicted by the model. A number L′ of subsets X1, . . . , XL′ of households
provides a set of L′ moment conditions, E [G2 (θ)] = 0.
(iv) Estimation using the Three Sets of Moments
Lending standards (ψ,γ,Ψ) are estimated jointly with preferences (α,β, ξ,Ω,Σ). We stack
the L instrumental variable moment conditions of the approval specification, the L’ moment
conditions of base utility analysis, and the L′′ moment conditions for subpopulations as in
Petrin (2002):
E (G(ψ,γ,Ψ, α,β, ξ,Ω,Σ)) = E

G0(ψ,γ,Ψ)
G1(α,β, ξ,Ω,Σ)
G2(α,β, ξ,Ω,Σ)
 = 0 (23)
A consistent and asymptotically normal estimator of household preferences and banks’ lend-
ing standards follows from Hansen (1982):
θˆ = argmaxθ∈ΘG
∗(θ)′G∗(θ) (24)
where θ = (ψ,γ,Ψ, α,β, ξ,Ω,Σ) and G∗(θ) = A(θ˜)Gˆ(θ), and A is a consistent estimate of
the square root of the inverse of the asymptotic variance-covariance matrix of the moments,
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obtained using θ˜, a preliminary consistent estimate of θ. Gˆ(θ) is the simulated sample
analogue of G(θ).
3.2 Estimation Steps
The model is estimated using three sources of data: the mortgage application and approval
data, the neighborhood data, and the household micro data. As the first set of moments is
taken from a different sampling process than the two other moments, estimating the lending
standards ψˆ, γˆ,Ψˆ can be performed separately in a first step. We then proceed in the
following steps for the estimation of household preferences αˆ, βˆ, ξˆ, Ωˆ, Σˆ:
1. For each observation i, t of the household sample:
(a) Predict the probability of approval φˆijt for each neighborhood j using the estimate
Λ
(
x′itψˆ + z
′
jtγˆ + x
′
itΨˆzjt
)
.
(b) Draw a choice set for individual i by drawing a dummy variable for each neigh-
borhood j equal to 1 with probability φˆijt. This defines a matrix of 0s and 1s,
noted Cijt.
(c) Draw a vector of i.i.d. multivariate standard normal random coefficients b˜it.
2. Then we minimize the objective function as in (24). To obtain G(θ) for a given vector
of parameters θ:
(a) Estimate the vector δˆt of base utilities using the contraction mapping (19).
(b) At each iteration of the contraction mapping, simulated total demand is Dˆ(j, t) =
1
Nt
∑Nt
i=1 Dˆ(j, t|xit, zjt, δˆt, β˜it), the average of individual demands. And simulated
individual demand is Dˆ(j, t|xit, zjt, δˆt, β˜it) = 1(Cijt = 1)· exp(δjt+x
′
itΩzjt+β˜
′
itzjt)∑
k,s.t.Cikt=1
exp(δkt+x
′
itΩzkt+β˜
′
itzkt)
.
The β˜it are obtained by multiplying b˜it by Σ1/2.
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(c) Perform the panel instrumental variable regression of base utilities δˆ on neigh-
borhood covariates instrumented by the vector Ξ, to obtain the panel residuals
∆ζˆ(θ) and compute the second empirical moments ∆Ξ∆ζˆ(θ).
(d) For each demographic subgroup X , estimate the demand of that subgroup for
each neighborhood using step (b)’s individual demands. This gives the second set
of moment conditions.
(e) Steps (c) and (d) together give the last two moments G1 and G2 of the objective
function G(θ). The weighting matrix is diagonal in the first step estimation, and
equal to the inverse of the variance covariance of the empirical moments in the
second step GMM estimation.
Further details of the optimization algorithm are presented in Appendix section B.
4 Empirical Findings
4.1 Data
The model is estimated for the 9 counties which are contiguous to the San Francisco Bay:
Alameda, Contra Costa, Marin, Napa, San Francisco, San Mateo, Santa Clara, Solano, and
Sonoma. Data is gathered for three decades: in 1990, 2000, and 2010.7
Mortgage Application Data
Mortgage application and approval data comes from data collected in accordance with the
Home Mortgage Disclosure Act (HMDA). The act mandates reporting of mortgage appli-
cation data by most depository and non-depository lending institutions.8 Thus, HMDA
7As the borders of metropolitan areas change over time, we use constant 2003 borders throughout the
analysis and for the three decennial waves of 1990 to 2010.
8Specifically, HUD regulates for-profit lenders that have combined assets exceeding $10 million and/or
originated 100 or more home purchase loans (including refinancing loans) in the preceding calendar year.
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disclosure requirements apply to more than 90% of all mortgage applications and origina-
tions (Dell’Arriccia et al. 2009). We focus on credit standards for first lien mortgages on
homeowner occupied houses.9 Each mortgage lender report the loan amount, the applicant’s
income, the applicant’s race and gender, and the census tract of the house. Such geographi-
cal information allows this paper to present lending standards that are location-specific and
that vary across the household income distribution and across races.
HMDA data are geographically matched to data on individual property transactions.
Data on individual property transactions was obtained from the mortgage company FNC
Inc.,10 which compiles transaction data based using public records and real estate sales.
FNC data not only includes the universe of transaction, but also the specific amount of each
transaction and its street address. Street addresses are geocoded using the transaction’s
street address and linked to each of our census tracts.11
Housing and Amenities Data
Households choose dwelling location based on the quality of housing structures, local ameni-
ties, transportation, and neighborhood demographics.
Neighborhood-level data is derived from Census block-group data of the 1990 Summary
Files 1 and 3, the 2000 Census Summary File 1, and the 2010 Summary File 1.12 There
are 4,418 block groups covering the San Francisco Bay area, with a median of 486 housing
units per block group, and a median land area of 0.57 square mile. The block group is the
smallest geographical unit for which the Census provides housing stock and demographic
9HMDA data contains information on the nature of the lien in the 2010 wave, but not in the 1990 and
2000 waves. To eliminate second lien mortgages, also known as piggyback loans, we used the distribution
of loan-to-income ratios by lien status for originated loans from Blackbox mortgage data. Below an average
LTI threshold of 1.8, a majority of loans are second liens. We eliminate second lien loans by building a
ZIP-code-specific LTI threshold, and estimate the approval specification for loans with an LTI above such
threshold.
10FNC Inc., headquartered in Oxford Mississippi, collects data that provides collateral information to the
mortgage industry.
11Geocoding was performed using Texas A&M’s geocoding services, with a higher than 90% success rate.
12We thank the National Historical Geographic Information System at the University of Minnesota for
providing formatted Census files.
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characteristics across three decades. As the borders of block groups may change across the
three decennial census waves, we keep constant 2000 block group borders by building new
block group-level census relationship files. Neighborhood characteristics are thus comparable
across the three waves.
The housing and amenities data comprises information on three dimensions that affect
households’ choice: characteristics of the housing structures (age of structure, median number
of rooms, price), school test score data, and neighborhood demographics (race, ethnicity,
household median income, fraction with college or associate degree, fraction with high school
or more).
California’s Department of Education provides Academic Performance Index (API) test
score data for each school of the Bay area, for the last two waves, 2000 and 2010 of our
neighborhood data. We use school district borders from the Census Bureau to match a block
group to each of the 141 elementary or unified school districts, and assign the elementary
school API to each block group. APIs are standardized by year to a mean of 0 and a standard
deviation of 1.
For the distribution of house values, we choose to use FNC transaction price data rather
than Census house values because, unlike the former, the latter are upper-censored and self-
reported, with the upper-censoring threshold depending on the census year.13 We verify that
the distribution of FNC transaction prices matches very well the distribution of Census house
values up to the censoring points. With 126,104 transactions in 2000, a typical blockgroup
of the San Francisco Bay Area has about 27.6 transactions in 2000. Thus, for each block
group, we built a house value measure using the median transaction price14 in each block
group and for each year of observation.
13Census values comprise the entire universe of houses, while FNC transaction data only measures prices
for the subset of houses that transact. However, census values are self-declared and may thus be subject to
non-classical measurement error.
14We also estimated the 25th percentile and the 75th percentile of transaction prices. Although the
heterogeneity of housing within a neighborhood could be a potential identification issue, estimation including
such moments in base utility regression did not reveal that such heterogeneity plays a substantial role in
determining utility.
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Block group data also includes a measure of the distance to the San Francisco Central
Business District as a proxy for access to retail and employment,15 and land area in square
miles to account for varying land surfaces across block groups.
Household data
This paper’s third data source is the 5% Census sample in 1990 and 2000, and the American
Community Survey in 2010, which are representative samples of households of the San Fran-
cisco Bay area.16 Household-level data provides an empirical estimate of the distribution
f(xit) of household characteristics. It thus allows for the integration of demand with respect
to household characteristics
´
df(x), as preferences for housing, local amenities, and neigh-
bors’ characteristics depend on individual household characteristics (third moments of the
model’s identifying conditions (23)). Individual characteristics include race (White, Black,
Hispanic, Asian),17 and income as measure by total money income of all household members
age 15+ during the previous year.
A representative sample of households also allows us to predict approval probabilities
for all household mortgages using estimated lending standards, regardless of whether they
applied for a mortgage in a given year or not (first moment of the model’s identifying con-
ditions (23)). In order to do so, we use the fact that the variables used to predict approval
probabilities for mortgage applicants can be obtained for all households by combining House-
hold data from the Census and transaction data from FNC.
15Borders of the CBD for the San Francisco bay area are according to the 1982 Census of Retail Trade as
in Glaeser, Gottlieb & Tobio (2012).
16We acknowledge support from the Integrated Public Use Microdata Series center at the University of
Missouri for providing comparable micro series across three decades.
17 We use consistent definitions for races, from the 2000 Census and as defined by the Office of Management
and Budget’s 1997 Revisions to the Standards for the Classification of Federal Data on Race and Ethnicity.
Thus a household is either “White, non-Hispanic,” “Black, non-Hispanic,” “Hispanic, of any race,” “Asian,
non-Hispanic,” or of “Any other race, non-Hispanic.”
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4.2 Estimation of Approval Probabilities
The objective is to estimate an approval regression model using actual mortgage approval
decisions, and then use this estimation to predict approval probabilities for all households
across all neighborhoods. HMDA is the only data source that informs approval decisions for
the universe mortgage applications in the metropolitan area. By contrast, audit-pair studies,
i.e. randomized controlled trials allows to directly estimate the causal impact of household
and loan characteristics on approval decisions, but are usually available only for a small
subset of applicants (Munnell, Tootell, Browne & McEneaney 1996, Ross & Yinger 2002).
HMDA data report, for each application, the approval decision, the income and the race of
the applicant, the size of the loan,18 and the tract-level location of the application. Other
mortgage data sources, such as Dealogic or Black Box, report more information such as the
loan-to-value ratio, the credit score, or the transaction price, but only for the originated
mortgages loans.
In the baseline logit specification, we predict the decision of mortgage approval, for a panel
of mortgage applications filed in 1990, 2000, and 2010, based on a number of borrower’s and
loan’s characteristics, including the loan-to-income ratio (LTI), the race of the applicant, the
type of loan (Conventional, FHA insured, VA insured, FSA-RHS insured19), time effects,
and census-tract, and issuer (i.e. bank) fixed effects. Results are are presented in Table 2
for various combination of fixed effects (no fixed effects (f.e.), census-tract f.e., bank f.e.,
census-tract and bank f.e.). For each estimation, the marginal probabilities, computed at
the means, and standard errors computed using a delta method, are presented next to the
logit coefficients. The coefficients of the race dummies and the type of loans should be
interpreted as relative to the dummy for Whites, and to the dummy for Conventional loan ,
respectively. Standard errors are clustered at the census tract level.
In all specifications, the coefficients for the LTI Ratio and for race dummies are significant
18Post 2002 HMDA data also report the interest rate of the loan.
19FHA - Federal Housing Administration; VA - Veteran Administration; FSA-RHS-(Farm Service Agency
or Rural Housing Service
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at one percent confidence level. As expected, the LTI ratio coefficient is negative: applying
for a larger loan relative to the applicant’s income reduces the chances of obtaining approval.
A one-standard deviation increase in LTI (+1.28) is associated in a reduction in the proba-
bility of approval ranging from 3.1 to 4.4 percentage points, depending on the specification.
Conditional on the observable characteristics included, black and hispanic applications face
a lower probability of approval. This negative effect gets mitigated as more fixed effects are
introduced. However, even in the most stringent specification (bank and census-tract fixed
effects), Blacks and Hispanics face probabilities of approval which are, respectively, 5.8 and
2.6 percentage points lower than the probability of approval for Whites. Finally, when banks
fixed characteristics are controlled for, applications made in 2000, i.e. during the mortgage
credit boom, enjoy an approval rate which is 6.6 percentage point higher than applications
made in either in 1990 or 2010. Table B in the appendix replicates the baseline regression
with tract fixed effects for a number of other metropolitan areas in the U.S. The estimated
parameters for these cities are very similar to those estimated for the San Francisco Bay, sug-
gesting that our approval model indeed capture common standards in mortgage origination
decisions.
Identifying the causal impact of applicant and neighborhood characteristics on lenders’
decision through the specification described above is challenging for at least two reasons.
First, households’ race, ethnicity and income are typically correlated with unobservable
dimensions of borrower creditworthiness. Second, loan characteristics are typically chosen
endogenously by banks and borrowers; such loan characteristics depend on the borrower’s
creditworthiness as well as observable and unobservable collateral (housing) characteristics.
We address the issue of the endogeneity of applicant and loan characteristics in the
following way. We augment the specification above by including tract fixed effect by year,
to capture time-varying location-specific unobservables, e.g. unobservables related to the
potential appreciation of a neighborhood. Introducing census-tract effects interacted with
year effects blows the number of fixed effect from 1,608 to about 4,824, and results in a lack
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of convergence of the logit estimation procedure. For this reason, we choose to present probit
results instead for this specification. Table (A) in the appendix presents the results. The
first fourth column allow to compare logit and probit results in the the baseline specification
with census-tract fixed effect and year fixed effects only, showing that the estimates of the
marginal probabilities are very similar in both specifications. The last two columns show
the probit regression results with time interacted with census fixed effect, and show that the
estimated marginal probabilities are almost the same than those obtained with a specification
with tract and year fixed effects only.
The approval regression is then used to predict the probability of approval for all house-
holds, and in each Census block group. In this out-of-sample estimation, the race of the
household comes from the Census, and the loan-to-income ratio is computing using FNC
housing price and the total household income of the Census, under the assumption of a
loan-to-value of 0.8, that is, the norm for conforming loans used for home purchase (Adelino,
Gerardi & Willen 2013).20
4.3 Estimated Preferences and Willingness to Pay for Amenities
This section presents estimated preferences with and without approval origination con-
straints. Estimated household preferences are the outcome of the optimization of the moment
conditions (Equation 23). Recall that preferences are allowed to vary across neighborhoods
(this utility component defines the base utility δ), across individuals, and to vary across
neighborhoods according to individual characteristics (Equation 1). In turn, the base utility
depends in turn on the neighborhood characteristics (Equation 2) which include: log median
transaction price log(pj), household demographic composition (race, income, and education),
school test scores (California’s API), and the quality of housing construction (age structure
and number of rooms). As discussion in Section 3.1, the estimation of the relationship be-
tween base utility, log price, and neighborhood characteristics requires an IV approach since
20Results are robust to the inclusion or exclusion of loans above the conforming loan limit.
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those variables are likely to be correlated with unobserved determinants of neighborhood
utility.
The instrumental variable strategy is as follows. First, the regression includes a location-
specific blockgroup fixed effect, so that the impact of housing characteristics, local ameni-
ties, and neighbors’ characteristics are estimated in changes across time rather than in cross
section. Second, we use time-variation in the observable characteristics of geographically
adjacent block groups as instruments for the decennial change in log price. Such instrumen-
tal variable strategy, in the spirit of Berry et al. (1995), is based on the assumption that
neighboring blocks’ changes in observable characteristics are less confounded by changes
in unobservables than the block’s own characteristics. Neighbors also sort endogenously
in unobservable and observable dimensions across neighborhoods. We instrument the de-
mographic composition (% black, % Hispanic, % Asian, log(median household income), %
college educated) by neighboring tracts’ demographic composition as in Bayer & Timmins
(2007).
The selection of the neighborhood characteristics included in the preference regression
builds on the existing literature. The racial composition of neighborhoods and its interaction
with household race allows to test for heterogenous racial preferences (Bayer, McMillan &
Rueben 2004, Bayer et al. 2007, Becker & Murphy 2009). The emphasis on the age of
dwellings and its interaction with income is stressed in filtering theory (Rosenthal 2014).
The inclusion of the number of rooms, as a proxy for the size of the dwellings, and its
interaction with the distance to the metropolitan area’s Central Business Districts, relates to
the monocentric model (Fujita 1989), and the sorting of individuals according to the relative
importance of their taste for either larger houses, or for closer proximity with the city center
and shorter commutes. The preference for more educated neighborhoods, in addition to
more aﬄuent neighbors, is linked to the literature on parents’ involvement in school and
education neighborhood peer effects (Durlauf 2004, Goux & Maurin 2007). Several of the
neighborhood characteristics are interacted with individual characteristics such as race and
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income, thus allowing for a multidimensional sorting.
Table (3) presents the estimation results. The first two columns present the estimated
coefficient and the willingness to pay according to the model with borrowing constraints.
The next two columns present the corresponding estimates for the model without borrowing
constraints. In that later model, the probability that any neighborhood j belongs to the
choice set of any household i in year t is set equal to one. The last column regresses
the difference in base utility with and without borrowing constraints, and thus assesses
the statistical significance of the differences between columns (1) and (2)’s coefficients. The
willingness to pay is the change in price that offsets a given change in the quality of amenities.
Formally for a given amenity zjtk, the willingness to pay ∆ log(p) for a change in amenity zjtk
is such that −α∆ log(p) = β ·∆(zk), i.e.− (β/α) ·∆(zk). In Table 3, we report the willingness
to pay corresponding to a one percentage point increase for the variables expressed in fraction
(fraction of each race, fraction of college graduates), and an increase of 10% of the standard
deviation for the all other variables.21
The sensitivity of the base utility to a change in the median price of a given neighborhood
is significantly stronger in the model without than in the model with borrowing constraints
(−1.742 vs. −1.584). In the model without borrowing constraints, the estimated sensitivity
of base utility to price reflects implicitly both household preferences and the negative effect
of higher prices on approval probability. By contrast, the model with approval constraints
disentangles both effects, and reveals a smaller sensitivity of the base utility to an increase
in house prices. The model also allows the sensitivity of utility to price to be heterogenous
across agents; the estimates reveal a slightly larger dispersion in the price-sensitivity of utility
in the model with borrowing constraints.
The estimates of the effects of the racial composition of neighborhoods on utility also
21As the distribution of the fraction black, Hispanic, or asian across neighborhoods is substantially right-
skewed (few neighborhoods with the majority of such residents), a one standard deviation change is a large
percentile increase. We choose to display a 1 percentage point increase in this case. All other amenities,
including the standardized Academic Performance Index, have symmetric distributions where a 1 standard
deviation increases corresponds to an increase of about 60 to 70 percentile ranks.
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reveals sharp differences between the two models. The willingness to pay for a non-black
household to live in a neighborhood with a significant lower fraction of black neighbors (i.e.
a variation of one percentage point in the fraction of Blacks) is $32,871 in the model with
borrowing constraints vs. $25,647 in the model without borrowing constraints. For Blacks,
the willingness to pay to live in neighborhoods with a lower fraction of Blacks is, as expected,
smaller in both models, but the difference in willingness to pay between the two models is
almost as high. Similar differences arise when we consider the fraction of Hispanics and
Asians, with the notable differences that Hispanic and Asian households derive a positive
utility from living in neighborhoods with more same-race neighbors. As discussed in Ouazad
& Rancière (Forthcoming) the existence of approval constraints mitigate how preferences for
neighborhoods’ racial composition gets reflected into demand differences. Therefore it is not
surprising that the model with approval constraints reveals sharper underlying differences
in preferences with regards to the racial composition of neighborhoods. Overall the model
without borrowing constraints tend to underestimate the preference-based willingness-to-pay
for more desirable neighborhoods because because they are subject to high probability of
denial for a large subset of households.
Similarly the model estimated with borrowing constraints exhibits a larger willingness to
pay for neighborhoods with a higher median income, a larger fraction of college graduates,
better performing public schools22, and more recently constructed dwellings. The differences
in willingness to pay between the two models is, however, smaller for differences in these
amenities than for differences in the racial composition of neighborhoods. The model without
borrowing constraints exhibits a slightly higher preference for larger houses. This latter result
suggests that the usual trade-off between a better neighborhood vs. a larger house, appears
to be less important when approval constraints are controlled for.
22The coefficient on API is stronger for households with income below the neighborhood mean income,
a finding which is likely to capture the preference for private school education, in some neighborhoods, for
households with an income high enough to afford it.
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4.4 Price Elasticity
The model with borrowing constraint allows to estimate separately two additive components
of the price elasticity of demand. By price elasticity of demand, we refer here to the elastic-
ity of the demand for a neighborhood with respect to its own price but we shall emphasize
that the model provides estimates for the complete set of cross-price and income elastic-
ities.23 The first component, the conditional elasticity of demand, is computed assuming
that approval-based choice sets are not affected by a change in house prices. Absent het-
erogeneity, the conditional elasticity is simply computed as one minus the market share of a
given neighborhood times the price-sensitivity of the base utility, and given the large num-
ber of neighborhoods (4,416), can be simply approximated by the price sensitivity. However,
neighborhood utility includes a household-specific coefficient on neighborhood log(price).
This implies that conditional price elasticity will be heterogenous. The second component,
the borrowing elasticity, captures the fall in demand associated with a fall in approval rates
following an increase in housing prices. This elasticity is also heterogenous reflecting dif-
ferences in the change in approval rates with respect to a change in prices across different
neighborhoods.
The sum of the two components gives the total (unconditional) price elasticity. Figure (2)
illustrates the elasticity decomposition with the distribution of elasticities across neighbor-
hood (top panels of the figure) and their sensitivity to the initial log price (bottom panels of
the same figure). Conditional demand elasticity is tightly centered around its mean (−1.58),
while the borrowing elasticity is much more heterogeneous reflecting large differences in the
approval response to a price increase across neighborhoods. Furthermore, there are striking
differences in the relationship between initial housing price and each component of the price
elasticity. The conditional elasticity is decreasing in the initial price level. The preference-
based demand for relatively expensive neighborhoods is less price-sensitive than those of
relatively cheap neighborhoods. The opposite is true for the borrowing elasticity. At a given
23The full matrix of total demand derivatives is used in the general equilibrium analysis of Section 5.
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income, buying in a more expensive neighborhood means a higher leverage and thus a lower
approval probability. As a consequence of these two opposite effects, the total elasticity
does not display any relationship with neighborhood prices. To evaluate this result, we can
compare it to the demand elasticity in the model without borrowing constraints (Figure (3)).
In this case, total demand elasticity is decreasing in housing prices and thus may not fea-
ture two important characteristics due to the mortgage approval channel: the high degree of
heterogeneity in demand elasticity and its lack of relationship with house prices.
5 General Equilibrium Impact of Lending Standards
The model allows a simulation of a change in lending standards of the magniture of the
credit boom (Dell’Arriccia et al. 2009). The model predicts that such relaxation of lending
standards typically leads to an increase in demand for most neighborhoods. This generally
leads to excess demand that outstrips housing supply. The general equilibrium price change
is the price change in each neighborhood that reduces excess demand to the point where
each neighborhood’s demand equals each neighborhood’s housing supply.
Even though neighborhood demand stays unchanged, neighborhood demand by race, eth-
nicity, and income changes. Thus the model predicts substantial reallocation of households
across space. We present in this section first the model’s predicted impact of lending stan-
dards on the distribution of prices across neighborhoods, and second the model’s predicted
impact of lending standards on households’ spatial segregation.
5.1 Comparative Statics: Price Impacts of Lending Standards
This section derives the impact of lending standards (ψ,γ,Ψ) on neighborhood log prices
log(p). We start by focusing on one specific coefficient, say, the coefficient of the log loan-
to-income ratio in the approval specification, noted as a scalar ψ. A change in the coefficient
ψ of the approval specification causes three different demand effects: first, a change in
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neighborhood demand at given prices. Second, the change in lending standards causes a
change in each neighborhood’s price (the general equilibrium change in prices) that in turn
causes a change in demand. Third, the change in lending standards causes a change in
neighborhoods’ racial composition, which affects households’ preferences for these specific
neighborhoods. Such three effects formally translate into:
dD
d log(p)
=
∂D
∂ψ︸︷︷︸
Direct Impact
+
∂D
∂ log(p)
· d log(p)
dψ︸ ︷︷ ︸
Impact due to price changes
+
∂D
∂v
· ∂v
∂ψ︸ ︷︷ ︸
Impact due to social preferences
(25)
Evidence suggests that short-run housing supply in San Francisco is inelastic. For the sake of
clarity, we start with a perfectly inelastic housing supply.24 The price change that maintains
demand equal to supply in each neighborhood ( dD
d log(p)
= 0) is such that:
d log(p)/dψ =
[
∂
∂ log(p)
D(log(p), ψ)
]−1 [
− ∂
∂ψ
D(log(p), ψ)− ∂D
∂v
· ∂v
∂ψ
]
(26)
a vector of size
∑
t Jt, i.e. one vector of log price changes per year of analysis. The vector of
prices log(p) affects demand through its impact on the base utility vector δ.
(i) Impact of Lending Standards on Demand, at Given Prices
We start with the impact of lending standards on demand at given prices. Lending standards
affect both the probability of each choice set, and the choice of the household within the
choice set. We start by focusing on the impact of lending standards on the probability of
the choice set.
∂
∂ψ
D(j|δ, z·t;ψ) =
∑
C∈C
ˆ
X
[
∂
∂ψ
P (C|z·t,xit;ψ)
]
· P (j|δ, z·t,xit, Cit) · f(xit)dxit (27)
24We extended the analysis with non-perfectly elastic housing supply, with results available on demand.
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Empirically the sum
∑
C∈C is taken over the set of simulated choice sets. The derivative of
the probability of the choice set P (C|z·t,xit;ψ) is the derivative of a product of J terms:
∂
∂ψ
P (C|z·t,xit;ψ) = ∂
∂ψ
[Πj∈CφjtΠk/∈C(1− φkt)] (28)
Each individual probability φjt has a simple derivative:
∂
∂ψ
φjt(zjt,xit;ψ) = wijt · φjt(zjt,xit;ψ) · {1− φjt(zjt,xit;ψ)} (29)
where wijt is the value corresponding to the coefficient ψ. Thus the derivative 29 is of the
sign of wijt. For instance, if wijt corresponds to the loan-to-income ratio, wijt is positive,
the coefficient ψ of the loan-to-income ratio in the approval specification is negative. An
increase in ψ will lead to an increase in φjt for all neighborhoods j of the city.
Aggregating such result over the Jt factors of (28):
∂P (C|z·t,xit, ψ)
∂ψ
= P (C|z·t,xit, ψ)
·
∑
j
wijt · {1(j ∈ C)− φjt(zjt,xit;ψ)}︸ ︷︷ ︸
Υijt(C)
(30)
The Monte Carlo simulated estimate of (27) is thus the sum:
̂∂
∂ψ
D(j|δ, z·t;ψ) = 1
#Cˆ
∑
C∈Cˆ
{Υijt(C) ·D(j|C, δ, z·t;ψ)} (31)
Each probability is multiplied by the factor Υijt(C). Such expression (31) is a column vector.
(ii) Impact of Prices on Demand, at Given Lending Standards
We then turn to the impact of log prices on demand. The matrix ∂
∂ log(p)
D(log(p), ψ) is
considered for year t. log(p) is a line vector of size Jt while D(p, ψ) is a column vector
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of size Jt. We distinguish diagonal elements, which are derivatives of demand w.r.t.25 its
own price (proportional to own-price demand elasticity), and off-diagonal elements, which
are derivatives of demand w.r.t. another neighborhood’s price (proportional to cross-price
demand elasticity).
The derivation of the cross-price demand elasticity yields a decomposition between bor-
rowing elasticity and conditional price elasticity, which is the analog to the one presented in
2 for the own-price demand elasticity:
∂D(j|δ, z·t;ψ)
∂ log(pk)
=
∑
C∈C
ˆ
X
∂
∂ log(pk)
P (C|z·t,xit;ψ) · P (j|δ, z·t,xit, Cit)f(xit)dxit︸ ︷︷ ︸
Shift in choice set
+
∑
C∈C
ˆ
X
P (C|z·t,xit;ψ) · ∂
∂ log(pk)
P (j|δ, z·t,xit, Cit)f(xit)dxit︸ ︷︷ ︸
Shift in utility
(32)
Shift in choice set induced by changing prices.
We first focus on the first term, which is the impact of the log price log(pk) on choice set
probabilities. For every choice set that includes neighborhood k the probability of that choice
set goes down, and for every choice set that does not include neighborhood k, the probability
of that choice set goes up.
∂
∂ log(pk)
P (C|z·t,xit;ψ) = ∂
∂ log(pk)
[Πj∈CφjtΠl /∈C(1− φlt)]
=
 −αapproval(1− φkt)P (C|z·t,xit;ψ) if k ∈ CαapprovalφktP (C|z·t,xit;ψ) if k /∈ C
25We note “with respect to” as w.r.t. in the remaining parts of this paper.
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Hence the first term (“shift in choice set”) in equation 32:
∂
∂ log(pk)
D(j|δ, z·t;ψ)|fixed utility
=
∑
C∈C
ˆ
X
αapproval (I(k ∈ C)− φkt)P (C|z·t,xit;ψ) · P (j|δ, z·t,xit, Cit)f(xit)dxit
Effect of prices on neighborhood choice within the choice set.
We then turn to the second term, i.e. the impact of prices on utility, thus to the impact of
prices on households’ choice within their choice set. The derivative of conditional demand
P (j) w.r.t. pk is αutility ·P (j) ·P (k). The coefficient αutility < 0 is the coefficient of log price
in utility. Thus the second term (“shift in utility”) in equation 32:
∂D(j|δ, z·t;ψ)
∂ log(pk)
∣∣∣∣
fixed choice set
= αutility
∑
C∈C
ˆ
X
P (C|z·t,xit;ψ) · P (j|δ, z·t,xit, Cit)P (k|δ, z·t,xit, Cit) · f(xit)dxit (33)
We apply this same logic to calculate the impact of the price of a neighborhood on its
own demand.
∂D(j|δ, z·t;ψ)
∂ log(pj)
=
∑
C∈C
ˆ
X
∂
∂ log(pj)
P (C|z·t,xit;ψ) · P (j|δ, z·t,xit, Cit)f(xit)dxit
+
∑
C∈C
ˆ
X
P (C|z·t,xit;ψ) · ∂
∂ log(pj)
P (j|δ, z·t,xit, Cit)f(xit)dxit (34)
which turns into the following explicit formula:
∂
∂ log(pj)
D(j|δ, z·t;ψ) =
∑
C∈C
ˆ
X
P (C|z·t,xit;ψ)
·αutilityP (j|δ, z·t,xit, Cit) · (1− P (j|δ, z·t,xit, Cit))f(xit)dxit
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(iii) Impact of Lending Standards on Social Preferences
The last step in completing the calculation of general equilibrium effects on prices is to derive
the impact of lending standards on neighborhood composition and the subsequent first-order
impact on households’ demand for such neighborhoods, noted −∂D
∂v
· ∂v
∂ψ
.
The second factor ∂v
∂ψ
is simply the vector of demands scaled by the total demand for the
neighborhood.
∂v
∂ψ
=
((
nk/n
) · (∂Dk
∂ψ
/D
))
k=1,2,...,M
where nk/n is the fraction of population k in the overall population of the metropolitan area.
The first factor ∂D
∂v
is also straightforwardly derived. Noting γk(xit) the coefficient of
social interactions for an individual with characteristics xit,
∂
∂vk
D(j|δ, z·t;ψ) =
∑
C∈C
ˆ
X
P (C|z·t,xit;ψ)
·γk(xit) · P (j|δ, z·t,xit, Cit) · (1− P (j|δ, z·t,xit, Cit))f(xit)dxit
γk(xit) varies across individuals: for instance, results suggest households’ preferences for
same-race neighbors.
(iv) General Equilibrium Impacts of Lending Standards on Prices
The general equilibrium impact of lending standards on prices is the shift in prices that
keeps demand for each neighborhood constant. We combine the analytic formulas of (i)–(iii)
above to derive the following: first, the impact of lending standards on demand at constant
prices; second, the impact of prices on demand; and third, the impact of lending standards on
neighborhood racial and income composition. All three effects lead to the general equilibrium
impact of lending standards on prices, following equation (26) above.
The derivations presented in the previous subsections (i)–(iii) were done by looking at the
marginal change of one arbitrary coefficient of the approval specification. Table 4 estimates
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the change in lending standards between 2000 and 2006, and suggests that there were changes
in underwriters’ sensitivity to the log(price) of the house, the log(income) of the applicant,
and to the race of the applicant. The regression is a panel logit regression combining data
from the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act of 2000 and 2006. The specification is similar to
the main baseline analysis of approval rates (Table 2), with added interactions between the
2006 year dummy and respectively: the log(price), the log(income) of the applicant, and
the applicant’s race. Results suggest a relaxation of lending standards in each of those
dimensions. We combine the comparative statics in each of these dimensions to obtain a
marginal change in lending standards comparable to the 2000–2006 relaxation.
Figure 4 illustrates the effect of such change in lending standards on mortgage approval,
housing demand, and the distribution of housing prices. Figure 4 (d) plots the average
marginal impact of such relaxation on the individual probability of approval. Almost all
neighborhoods experience an increase in average approval probability, except for the neigh-
borhoods with the highest prices (log(prices) above 14, i.e. prices above $1.2M). The rise in
the approval probability is higher in neighborhoods with lower prices. Figure 4 (c) plots the
implied partial equilibrium effect, where the increase in demand (vertical axis) at constant
prices is plotted against the initial log(price) in 2000. For neighborhoods with the lowest
initial price, demand increases by more than 20% on average, while neighborhoods with
the highest initial price see a decline in demand at partial equilibrium. Figure 4 (f) shows
that neighborhoods with low initial prices are also neighborhoods with a high initial fraction
black. Black households’ preferences for same-race neighbors thus leads to an increase in
black demand for black neighborhoods, an effect depicted in Figure 4 (e) (“social interaction
impacts”, noted ∂D/∂v · ∂v/∂ψ ).
Figure 2(f) showed that there is little correlation between the initial price level and total
demand elasticity. Hence the partial equilibrium effect of lending standards on demand
Figure 4(c) combined with the social interaction impacts of Figure 4(e) explain why the
general equilibrium impact of lending standards on prices leads to a greater increase in
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prices in neighborhoods with lower prices (Figure 4(a)). The general equilibrium impact
on prices is obtained following equation 26, and rescaled to obtain the equivalent annual
change. As the change in lending standards is calculated over 2000-2006, the vertical axis of
Figure 4(a) is the annual Compound Annual Growth Rate (CAGR).
The general equilibrium comparative statics of the estimated model is thus able to repro-
duce the negative correlation between the increase in neighborhood prices and their initial
values that has been observed in the San Francisco Bay and in several other major cities
during the boom (Landvoigt et al. 2015). The compression of the price distribution between
2000 and 2006, which is partly driven by differences in the intensity of borrowing constraints
accross households and neighborhoods, arises even if the estimation of the model did not use
any information for the boom years beyond the year 2000.
5.2 Impacts of Lending Standards on Spatial Segregation
The general equilibrium price change maintains demand in each neighborhood constant.
However, the demand of particular racial or other demographic subgroups for each neigh-
borhood is typically affected by changes in lending standards.
Consider, for example, the demandDrjt of racial group r ∈ {white, hispanic, black, asian, other}
for a specific neighborhood j in year t. The total change in demand caused by a change in
lending standards is decomposed into a partial equilibrium effect, an effect due to social
preferences, and a change due to shifts in the distribution of prices:
dDrjt
dψ
=
∂Drjt
∂ψ︸ ︷︷ ︸
partial equilibrium
+
∂Drjt
∂ log(p)
· d log(p)
dψ︸ ︷︷ ︸
general equilibrium
+
∂Drjt
∂v
· ∂v
∂ψ︸ ︷︷ ︸
preferences for same race neighbor
(35)
and in general dDrjt/dψ 6= 0, while dD/dψ = 0. Given racial groups’ changing demand, the
model gives a structural estimate of how changes in lending standards affect racial segregation
across neighborhoods within the metro area.
As measure of Bay Area-wide racial segregation we use the isolation and exposure indices,
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as in Massey & Denton (1988) and Cutler, Glaeser & Vigdor (1999). The isolation index for
a given racial subgroup (say, Hispanics of any race) measures the average fraction of same-
race neighbors for an average member of that racial subgroup (e.g. the average Hispanic
resident). Thus the
Isolation(Blacks)t =
J∑
j=1
Blackjt
Black
· Blackjt
Populationjt
(36)
where the first factor Blackjt/Black is the share of black population living in neighborhood
j in year t; and the second factor Blackjt/Populationjt is the fraction black in neighborhood
j in year t.
An increase in black isolation is due to a decline in black exposure to other races. Black
exposure to Whites, for instance, is the average fraction of white neighbors for an average
black household.
Exposure(Whites|Blacks)t =
J∑
j=1
Blackjt
Black
· Whitejt
Populationjt
(37)
In both definitions (36) and (37) black population in neighborhood j in year t is simply the
total black population count in the metro area multiplied by black neighborhood demand
for that area, i.e. Blackjt = Black · Dblack,jt, as Dblack,jt ∈ (0, 1). Similarly, Whitejt =
White ·Dwhite,jt.
Thus the model provides a structural prediction of the impact of lending standards on
racial isolation and exposure. For instance, deriving (36) with respect to the lending standard
parameter ψ as in the previous section:
d
dψ
Isolation(Blacks)t =
d
dψ
[
J∑
j=1
Blackjt
Black
· Blackjt
Populationjt
]
=
Black
Population
· d
dψ
[
J∑
j=1
Dblack,jt
Djt
]
(38)
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And similarly for the exposure of, say, Blacks to Whites. The change in isolation is propor-
tional to the average ratio of the change in black demand to the change in total demand.
The resultant analysis of the impact of lending standards on neighborhoods’ racial com-
position and on racial segregation are presented in Figure 5 and in Table 5. The starting
point of such comparative statics is the spatial distribution of racial groups in the Bay area
in 2000.
Figure 5(a) is a scatter plot where each black dot is a neighborhood. The vertical axis is
the predicted change in white demand for the neighborhood at given prices, as a percentage
of initial demand, while the horizontal axis is the fraction black in 2000. The red rots are
the neighborhoods’ predicted change in white demand accounting for the general equilibrium
change in prices. The figure suggests that a relaxation of lending standards leads to a
substantially higher increase in white demand in neighborhoods that are majority non-black
than in neighborhoods with more than 10 to 20% black population. Interestingly, as prices
respond to the more lenient lending standards, white population change in majority non-
black neighborhoods is less than predicted by the partial equilibrium changes, but remains
substantially higher in majority non-black neighborhoods. Thus Figure 5(a) suggests that
the exposure of Blacks to White should decline when lending standards are relaxed.
Figure 5(b) (resp., (d)) suggests a similar pattern for Hispanics (resp., Asians): the
relaxation of lending standards should lead to a decline in black exposure to Hispanics (resp.
to Asians).
Interestingly, Figure 5(c) shows that black mobility to majority black neighborhoods
is muted by general equilibrium price changes. Indeed, at given prices (black dots), the
relaxation of lending standards would lead to substantially higher black demand for black
neighborhoods than for majority non-black neighborhoods. But, when accounting for the
change in prices at equilibrium (red dots), the rise in black demand does not exceed 4-5% of
initial 2000 demand.
Figure 5(e) suggests that there is a broadly positive correlation between the fraction black
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in the neighborhood in 2000 and the increase in log price, as expected given Figure 4 and the
negative correlation between the fraction black and the log(price). However, the relationship
between the increase in log(price) and the initial fraction black, displayed in Figure 5(e),
is non-monotonic and U-shaped: the largest price increases are observed in neighborhoods
with either a low share of black population or with a high share of black population. The
price increase in majority non-black neighborhoods is not high enough to offset the partial
equilibrium rise in white demand for non-black neighborhoods.
Such neighborhood-level analysis is summarized in Table 5, which presents the com-
parative statics impact of lending standards on our racial segregation measures. Table (a)
presents such impacts at given prices, while Table (b) presents the total impact, once price
changes are accounted for. The diagonal of each table is the isolation of Whites, Blacks, His-
panics, Asians (the exposure of a racial group to itself), while off-diagonal elements present
the impact on the exposure of a racial group to another. All estimates are in percentage
points, as isolation and exposure measures are expressed in percentages.
Results suggest that a relaxation of lending standards will lead to a decline in the exposure
of Blacks to Whites, by 2.04 percentage points, and a decline in the Exposure of Whites to
Blacks, by 0.36 percentage points. This decline is not predicted by partial equilibrium
analysis: Table 5(a) shows that a partial equilibrium analysis would lead to predict an
increase in black exposure to Whites and an increase in white exposure to Blacks.
Overall Table 5(b) predicts that the relaxation of lending standards will lead to a decline
in black isolation only through the increased black exposure to Hispanics and Asians.
Such segregation results, provided by the comparative statics of the estimated model,
confirm the empirical finding of Ouazad & Rancière (Forthcoming). Using data for all U.S.
metropolitan areas, Ouazad & Rancière (Forthcoming) shows that the relaxation of lending
standards during the credit boom has lead to a reduction in the exposure of Whites to Blacks.
The estimated model provides a direct quantification of the relative importance of general
vs. partial equilibrium effects, and shows how the compression of the price distribution is
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consistent with a lower exposure of Blacks to Whites.
Beyond the broad picture of an increase in segregation, the results also suggest the
possibility of limited white gentrification of a number of initially mostly black neighborhoods.
We observe in Figure 5 (a) a modest increase in the demand of Whites for mostly black
neighborhoods. In that case the partial equilibrium demand effect is not muted by general
equilibrium effect despite the sharp increase in house prices in these neighborhoods (Figure 5
(b)). By contrast, in the very same neighborhoods, the increase in the partial equilibrium
demand by Blacks is strongly muted in general equilibrium. Put together this evidence points
toward some limited gentrification of the kind observed in some neighborhoods of Oakland
during the credit boom.
6 Conclusion
This paper’s objective was to put forward and estimate a model of neighborhood choice
that explicitly takes into account the role of borrowing constraints. The new methodology
developed is based on the idea that differences in probability of mortgage approval across
neighborhoods shape the choice set of prospective home buyers. This approach yields results
that are substantially different from those obtained from models omitting the role of mortgage
credit.
We show and explain how key preference features such as the additional premium put to
live in neighborhoods with high quality schools, or the preference of Whites to live among
racial peers, can be substantially underestimated when omitting the role of borrowing con-
straints. The model with borrowing constraints also allows separate estimation of two key
components of the price-elasticity of demand, one which reflects preference-based willing-
ness to pay, and the other who reflects the impact of price changes on the probability to
obtain a mortgage. These new elasticity estimates could be provide a useful guidance to
(i) policymakers estimating the impact of taxation on prices, and to (ii) potential real estate
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developers seeking to price new housing units.
The estimated model enables to run a large variety of counterfactual experiments and to
distinguish, in each case, the role played by partial vs. general equilibirum effects, preferences
vs. approval constraints. The model also accounts for social multiplier effects. In this paper,
we focus on the effect of a variation in lending standards on the dynamics of house prices
and segregation. We show that the model makes two out-of-sample predictions that are well
in line with the data: (i) the compression in the dispersion of prices, and (ii) the increase in
segregation.
There are many other dimensions in which the estimated model could be used to under-
stand the dynamics of cities. For example, it could be used to assess the effects of a change
in the level or distribution of income, of a change in the distribution of the quality of schools,
or in the supply of transportation. The model could also be used “in reverse” in order to
trace down the fundamental causes of salient city transformations such as the gentrification
of some neighborhoods.
Finally, the model focuses on household mobility within a city. A natural (but far from
trival) extension would be to incorporate mobility between cities as well.
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Figure 3: Demand Elasticity Distributions – Model without Borrowing Constraints
This Figure presents the elasticity of demand (w.r.t. own price) in the model without bor-
rowing constraints. This amounts to constraining the probability of approval to 1 for every
neighborhood and for every household. Figure (a) is the distribution of neighborhood demand
elasticities in 2000. In Figure (b) each dot is a neighborhood in 2000, and the red line is the
OLS regression of demand elasticity on current log(price) in 2000.
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(b) Demand Elasticity vs. log(Price)
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Table 1: Summary Statistics and Data Sources
The first part of this table presents neighborhood data from a variety of sources: Summary
File 3 of the 1990 and 2000 Censuses and employment numbers from the ZIP-level County
Business Patterns. The second part is household data from the 1% Census microfiles in
1990, 2000, 2010 for the San Francisco MSA. The third part presents mortgage application
data from the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act of 1990 and 2000.
Mean Median S.D. Min Max Obs.
Blockgroup Data
log(Median price) 12.757 12.737 0.688 7.601 18.258 11,611
Median number of rooms 5.156 5.062 1.254 0.074 9.100 11,611
Median age of structure 33.562 35.000 17.052 0.000 61.000 11,611
Frac. Black 0.078 0.025 0.140 0.000 0.948 11,611
Frac. Hispanic 0.278 0.170 0.289 0.002 1.818 11,611
Frac. Asian 0.175 0.116 0.163 0.000 0.983 11,611
log(Median household income) 11.050 11.053 0.542 6.787 12.429 11,611
Frac. college educated 0.439 0.426 0.211 0.000 0.972 11,611
Frac. more than high school 0.582 0.517 0.251 0.033 1.000 11,611
Frac. denied 0.132 0.141 0.052 0.000 0.615 11,611
Micro Census Data
Household Income 168,300 68,440 864,759 10,000 100,000 120,029
White 0.555 1.000 0.497 0.000 1.000 120,029
Black 0.062 0.000 0.240 0.000 1.000 120,029
Hispanic 0.157 0.000 0.364 0.000 1.000 120,029
Asian 0.201 0.000 0.401 0.000 1.000 120,029
Mortgage Application Data
Approved 0.769 1.000 0.421 0.000 1.000 163,630
Loan to Income Ratio 3.380 3.267 0.874 1.883 6.117 163,630
Loan Amount (’000) 424.503 436.000 132.960 78.000 638.000 163,630
Applicant Income (’000) 162.710 150.000 73.531 44.000 406.000 163,630
Black 0.063 0.000 0.243 0.000 1.000 163,630
Hispanic 0.021 0.000 0.143 0.000 1.000 163,630
Asian 0.209 0.000 0.406 0.000 1.000 163,630
FHA Loan 0.001 0.000 0.018 0.000 1.000 163,630
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Table 2: Mortgage Approval Equation – 1990–2010
The table presents estimation of the approval model (Specification 6). Columns (1)–(2)
present the specification without neighborhood-specific unobservable controls. Columns
(3)–(4) include neighborhood-specific unobservable controls. Columns (5)–(6) include
bank-specific and other mortgage originator specific lending standard controls.
Logit Marginal Logit Marginal
Coefficients Probabilities Coefficients Probabilities
Specification:
No Fixed Effect Tract FE
LTI Ratio -0.239*** -0.028*** -0.252*** -0.028***
(0.008) (0.001) (0.008) (0.001)
Black -0.939*** -0.110*** -0.718*** -0.080***
(0.031) (0.004) (0.031) (0.003)
Asian -0.121*** -0.014*** -0.066*** -0.007***
(0.020) (0.002) (0.021) (0.002)
Hispanic -0.555*** -0.065*** -0.331*** -0.037***
(0.025) (0.003) (0.029) (0.003)
Other Race -0.467*** -0.055*** -0.410*** -0.046***
(0.025) (0.003) (0.024) (0.003)
2000 -0.019 -0.002 0.026 0.003
(0.023) (0.003) (0.024) (0.003)
2010 0.005 0.001 0.031 0.003
(0.027) (0.003) (0.031) (0.003)
FHA Insured Loan 0.011 0.001 0.150*** 0.017***
(0.026) (0.003) (0.029) (0.003)
Observations 208,936 208,936 208,206 208,206
Census Tracts 1,911 1,911 1,606 1,606
Pseudo R Squared 0.0186 0.0186 0.0436 0.0436
Specification:
Bank FE Tract and Bank FE
LTI Ratio -0.331*** -0.032*** -0.343*** -0.031***
(0.027) (0.003) (0.009) (0.008)
Black -0.819*** -0.078*** -0.630*** -0.058***
(0.034) (0.003) (0.036) (0.015)
Asian -0.157*** -0.015*** -0.123*** -0.011***
(0.034) (0.003) (0.022) (0.003)
Hispanic -0.446*** -0.042*** -0.285*** -0.026***
(0.049) (0.005) (0.031) (0.007)
Other Race -0.388*** -0.037*** -0.353*** -0.032***
(0.042) (0.004) (0.025) (0.009)
2000 0.691*** 0.066*** 0.742*** 0.068***
(0.264) (0.025) (0.045) (0.018)
2010 0.104 0.01 0.133** 0.012**
(0.186) (0.018) (0.055) (0.006)
FHA Insured Loan -0.207 -0.020 -0.093*** -0.008***
(0.156) (0.015) (0.033) (0.003)
Observations 189,470 189,470 188,578 188,578
Census Tracts 472 472 1,595 1,595
Pseudo R Squared 0.143 0.143 0.162 0.162
55
Table 3: Household Preferences and Willingness to Pay (WTP) for Local Amenities
The table reports estimates of the base utilities and their relationships with observable neigh-
borhood amenities. We consider the model with borrowing constraints (column (1)), the
model without borrowing constraints (column (2)). Column (4) reports the regression of the
difference in base utilities in the two models.
Dependent variable:
δcredit WTP, credit δno credit WTP δcredit − δno credit
log(Median price) -1.584 - -1.742 - 0.157
(0.101) (0.095) (0.010)
σ(log(Median price)) 0.138 - 0.113 - -
(0.025) (0.028)
Frac. Black -11.928 -7.53% -10.235 -5.88% -1.693
(0.198) -$ 32,871 (0.187) -$ 25,647 (0.020)
× Black 15.758 2.42% 13.754 2.22% -
(0.089) $ 10,555 (0.080) $ 9,698
Frac. Hispanic -1.993 -1.26% -2.066 -1.19% 0.072
(0.201) -$ 5,492 (0.189) -$ 5,177 (0.020)
× Hispanic 7.627 3.56% 7.412 3.38% -
(0.077) $ 15,526 (0.073) $ 14,732
Frac. Asian -2.936 -1.85% -2.717 -1.56% -0.218
(0.172) -$ 8,091 (0.162) -$ 6,808 (0.018)
× Asian 7.643 2.94% 7.295 2.63% -
(0.087) $ 12,971 (0.081) $ 11,472
log(Median hh income) 0.636 2.18% 0.622 1.94% 0.014
(0.046) $ 9,499 (0.043) $ 8,448 (0.005)
× (log(Individual Household Income) - 0.954 6.02% 0.934 5.90% -
mean log(income) ) (0.004) $ 26,290 (0.004) $ 25,739
Frac. College Graduate 0.562 0.35% 0.529 0.30% 0.033
(0.121) $ 1,549 (0.114) $ 1,326 (0.012)
Median Age of Structure -0.018 -1.84% -0.018 -1.67% 0.000
(0.001) -$ 8,026 (0.001) -$ 7,298 (0.000)
Median Number of Rooms 0.129 1.04% 0.149 1.09% -0.02
(0.182) $ 4,550 (0.172) $ 4,779 (0.019)
Median Number of Rooms -0.019 0.53% -0.021 0.48% -
× log(Distance to CBD) (0.017) $ 2,306 (0.016) $ 2,111
Academic Performance Index 0.061 0.39% 0.025 0.14% 0.036
(0.009) $ 1,681 (0.001) $ 626 (0.001)
× (log(Individual Household Income) - -0.227 -1.43% -0.1544 -0.97% -
mean log(income) ) (0.003) -$ 6,256 (0.003) -$ 4,255
Observations 13,154 - 13,154 - 13,154
Neighborhoods (Blockgroups) 4,416 - 4,416 - 4,416
Years 3 - 3 - 3
R Squared 0.336 - 0.293 - 0.983
∗∗: significant at 1%, ∗: significant at 5%, +: significant at 10%.
Standard errors clustered by block group in parenthesis.
Table 4: Change in Lending Standards between 2000 and 2006
The table presents estimation of the approval model (Specification 6), with the 2006 mort-
gage application data.
Approved Change 2000 – 2006
log(Price) –0.352* +0.159
(0.127) (0.140)
log(Income) 0.759* –0.503*
(0.110) (0.115)
Constant –2.111 +2.967*
(0.962) (1.113)
Black or African American, Nonhispanic -1.154* +0.345*
(0.086) (0.093)
Hispanic, Any Race –0.716* +0.294**
(0.103) (0.117)
Asian, Nonhispanic –0.286* +0.404*
(0.069) (0.075)
Observations 103,176
Census Tracts 1,315
Pseudo R Squared 0.0407
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Table 5: General Equilibrium Effects of Lending Standards on Racial Segregation
The table presents the comparative statics impact of the marginal change in lending standards
on racial segregation. Table (a) is the impact on racial exposure at given prices, and Table (b)
is the total impact, accounting for price changes, on racial exposure (Section (5.2)). The
tables read as follows: the cell in the second row and the first column is the impact of lending
standards on the exposure of Blacks to Whites, in percentage points. The diagonal of each
table is the impact on isolation, i.e. the exposure of a racial group to same-race neighbors.
(a) Partial Equilibrium Segregation Changes
Exposure to
Exposure of White Black Hispanic Asian
White +12.77 ppt +1.47 ppt +4.71 ppt +3.52 ppt
Black +5.72 ppt +13.92 ppt +4.40 ppt +2.70 ppt
Hispanic +6.86 ppt +2.51 ppt +10.74 ppt +2.78 ppt
Asian +7.77 ppt +1.83 ppt +4.12 ppt +8.61 ppt
(b) General Equilibrium Segregation Changes
Exposure to
Exposure of White Black Hispanic Asian
White +3.99 ppt –0.36 ppt +1.65 ppt +0.71 ppt
Black –2.04 ppt –0.62 ppt +1.90 ppt +0.76 ppt
Hispanic +1.42 ppt –0.38 ppt –1.56 ppt +0.52 ppt
Asian +1.80 ppt –0.32 ppt +1.42 ppt –2.89 ppt
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Appendix Table A: Mortgage Approval Equation – Additional Identification Strategies
– 1990–2010
The table presents estimation of the approval model (Specification 6) using a probit with
Tract × Year fixed effects. Columns (1)–(2) present the coefficients and marginal prob-
abilities for the probit model with fixed effect. Columns (3)–(4) present results with the
Tract × Year fixed effects.
Probit Tract F.e. Probit Tract × Year F.e.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Coeff. M.P. Coeff. M.P.
Loan to Income Ratio -0.136*** -0.029*** -0.139*** -0.029***
(0.004) (0.001) (0.004) (0.001)
Black -0.403*** -0.086*** -0.413*** -0.085***
(0.018) (0.004) (0.018) (0.004)
Asian -0.037*** -0.008*** -0.043*** -0.009***
(0.011) (0.002) (0.011) (0.002)
Hispanic -0.184*** -0.039*** -0.192*** -0.040***
(0.016) (0.003) (0.016) (0.003)
Other Race -0.224*** -0.048*** -0.228*** -0.047***
(0.013) (0.003) (0.013) (0.003)
FHA Insured Loand 0.077*** 0.016*** 0.091*** 0.019***
(0.016) (0.003) (0.016) (0.003)
VA-guaranteed 0.098*** 0.021*** 0.108*** 0.022***
(0.038) (0.008) (0.039) (0.008)
FSA-RHS -0.242 -0.051 -0.285* -0.059*
(0.168) (0.036) (0.172) (0.035)
Year 2000 0.020 0.004 0.012***
(0.013) (0.003) (0.003)
Year 2010 0.020 0.004 0.524***
(0.016) (0.003) (0.020)
Observations 208,206 208,206 206,277 206,277
Census Tracts 1,606 1,603
Pseudo R Squared .0434 .0587
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A Appendix: Equilibrium Properties
Proposition 1. (Equilibrium Existence) There exists an equilibrium vector of prices
and neighborhood demographics (p∗ = (p∗jt),v∗ = (v∗jt))j=1,2,...,J, t=1,2,...,T that satisfies
conditions (16) and (17).
Proof. For notational convenience, and without loss of generality, we consider a scalar
rather than vector vj, i.e. households have a preference for neighbors of only one demo-
graphic subgroup. We start by proving existence with an non-perfectly elastic housing
supply, and then turn to equilibrium existence with a perfectly elastic housing supply.
First, note that the equilibrium of the city can be equivalently rewritten as:
s−11 (D1(p1, . . . , pJ , v1, . . . , vJ) = p1
...
s−1J (DJ(p1, . . . , pJ , v1, . . . , vJ)) = pJ
DW1 (p1, . . . , pJ , v1, . . . , vJ) = W1s1
...
DW2 (p1, . . . , pJ , v1, . . . , vJ) = WJsJ
and define the mapping: φ : RJ× [0, 1]J → RJ× [0, 1]J . The mapping is continuous given
the functional forms of the supply curves, the demand curves, and the probability of
origination. Notice that the upper bound of Dj is 1 for each function, hence the mapping
φ takes its values in [s−1(0); s−1(1)]J × [0, 1]J , which is a closed compact subset of RJ ×
[0, 1]J . We can thus consider the mapping φ˜ of [s−1(0); s−1(1)]J× [0, 1]J to itself, equal to
φ on [s−1(0); s−1(1)]J×[0, 1]J . Such a mapping is continuous, and [s−1(0); s−1(1)]J×[0, 1]J
is a convex set of a Banach space. Hence, by the Brouwer fixed point theorem, φ˜ admits
a fixed point, i.e. a vector (p∗1, . . . , p∗J , v∗1, . . . , v∗J) that satisfies the 2J equations that
define the equilibrium.
We then consider the case of a perfectly inelastic housing supply. Set sj(p) = sj · pηs
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with ηs the elasticity of housing supply. For a given ηs consider the set of equilibrium
vectors E(ηs) = {(p∗1, . . . , p∗J , v∗1, . . . , v∗J)}. We just showed that E(ηs) 6= ∅ for any ηs > 0.
Consider a sequence of equilibrium vectors for a sequence of ηs → 0. Such sequence of
equilibrium vectors converges to a vector (p∗ = (p∗jt),v∗ = (v∗jt))j=1,2,...,J, t=1,2,...,T that is
an equilibrium price vector when ηs = 0.
Proposition 2. (Global Equilibrium Uniqueness with no Social Preferences)
Where there are no preferences for same-race neighbors (γi = 0), the city equilibrium is
unique, up to one price.
Proof. To prove such equilibrium uniqueness, we extend the model by treating consumer
income as a household endowment ωi for each household i. Consumer demand for neigh-
borhood j is Dj(p1, . . . , pJ , p), where p is the price of the numeraire consumer good. Thus
the value of household i’s endowment is pωi in terms of the numeraire good. Now notice
that demand for neighborhood j is homogeneous, as the approval specification depends
on the ratio of price and income and neighborhood demands are left unchanged when
all prices are multiplied by a constant. Thus p can be normalized to 1. Note also that
as the price of neighborhood j increases, demand for neighborhood j strictly decreases
(the probability of acceptance goes down strictly and the utility value of neighborhood
j strictly decreases). When the price of neighborhood −j strictly increases, demand for
neighborhood j strictly increases (the probability of acceptance in neighborhood −j goes
down strictly, and the utility value of neighborhood −j strictly decreases). Thus housing
in neighborhood 1 and housing in neighborhood 2 are gross substitutes. By Proposition
17.F.3 of Mas-Colell, Whinston, Green et al. (1995), the equilibrium of the city is unique
up to one neighborhood price.
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B Appendix: Estimation Technique
B.1 Estimation Algorithm
We estimate the model using the nested fixed point (NFP) method of Berry et al. (1995).
Su & Judd (2012) has shown that the NFP and the MPEC method of Dubé, Fox & Su
(2012) are equivalent, but the NFP method requires a tight tolerance level to converge.
The inner loop of our contraction mapping uses a 10−12 tolerance, and the outer loop a
10−6 tolerance level.
Estimating the model in double precision Fortran has considerable impacts on speed
and precision. The algorithm is available through the corresponding author. The con-
traction mapping is also parallelized by acknowledging that the demand for housing is
independent across the three decades of the data, 1990, 2000, and 2010. For each com-
putation of δ = (δ1990, δ2000, δ2010) therefore, the R package snowfall parallelizes the
three contraction mappings.
Minimization of the objective function G(θ) proceeds using the Nelder-Mead algo-
rithm, and the global nature of the optimum θˆ is assessed using profile GMM objective
functions. Specifically, for a given estimate θˆ = (θˆ1, . . . , θˆK) and for each k, we plot the
function G(θˆ1, . . . θˆk−1, θk, θˆk+1, θˆK) with θk going from θ to θ.
63
